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511 
THE UNITED STATES AND IRAQ: PLANT 
PATENT PROTECTION AND SAVING SEED 
I. INTRODUCTION 
United States courts interpret the Patent Act
1
 to protect seed 
companies‘ interests in their patented seed varieties, preventing farmers 
from ―saving seed‖ for reuse or resale.2 ―Saving seed‖ is the practice of 
saving seed yield from one harvest for future crop use.
3
 Saving seeds for 
―brown bag sale‖ occurs when farmers purchase seed from seed 
companies, plant the seed in their own field, harvest the crop, and then sell 
the reproduced seed to other farmers for them to plant as crop-seed on 
their own farms.
4
 Though the United States has entered into international 
treaties that explicitly protect a farmer‘s right to save seed for replanting, 
U.S. patent law functions to protect biotech companies from infringement 
on their protected genetic seed sequences.
5
 Iraq is not yet party to any of 
the main international treaties affecting biotech seed companies and 
farmers, nor is Iraqi patent law well defined.
6
 However, orders with the 
 
 
 1. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). The Patent Act states: ―Whoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.‖ Id. 
Section 161 of the Patent Act specifies:  
Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant, 
including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than a tuber 
propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.  
35 U.S.C. § 161 (2006).  
 2. See Mary Ann Liebert, CAFC Again Agrees You Can’t Save Seed, 27 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. 
REP. 221 (2008). 
 3.  
Farmers save seed for many reasons. Every year new hybrids and new varieties of seed are 
produced with specific varieties developed for different climates and different growing 
environments. . . . Some of these varieties will succeed, and some will fail. Therefore, to 
reduce risk of low yield and profitability, rather than gamble on one variety of seed, farmers 
choose to plant their fields with multiple varieties. . . . Prior to the introduction of genetically 
modified seed, saving seed was the usual practice among farmers since time immemorial.  
Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting Around Statutory Protection of 
Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93, 95 nn.9–10 (2006) (citations omitted). Saving seeds 
for ―brown bag sale‖ occurs when farmers purchase seed from seed companies, plant the seed in their 
own field, harvest the crop, and then sell the reproduced seed to other farmers for them to plant as 
crop-seed on their own farms.  
 4. See Jay P. Kesan, Licensing Restrictions and Appropriating Market Benefits from Plant 
Innovation, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1081, 1083–84 (2006). 
 5. Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009, 1013–14 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 
309 (2008).  
 6. Elizabeth Mirza Al-Dajani, Comment, Post Saddam Restructuring of Intellectual Property 
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force of law, instituted by the Coalition Provisional Authority after the 
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq,
7
 leave Iraqi farmers‘ ability to save seed in 
question.
8
  
U.S. courts uniformly find that farmers are prohibited from saving seed 
from plants patented under the Patent Act.
9
 While Congress enacted 
legislation to give effect to international treaties that defend farmers‘ rights 
to save seed,
10
 the Supreme Court has found that these statutes do not 
conflict with the Patent Act.
11
 Other countries differ in their interpretation 
of the intersection between national patent protection and international 
treaty protections.
12
 This Note therefore proposes that the Coalition 
Provisional Authority‘s imposition of rules prohibiting saving seed 
preempted the Iraqi government from considering the issue. Given cultural 
differences, the struggle to emerge as a successful post-war State, and 
Iraq‘s unique agricultural needs, the Coalition Provisional Authority‘s rule 
on saving seed will likely be detrimental to Iraqi farmers.  
In this Note, I will outline the kinds of patents that U.S. courts have 
interpreted to prohibit saving seed. I will then detail international treaties 
that address farmers‘ ability to save seed, followed by the analysis U.S. 
courts have applied to the question of saving patented seed. I will review 
 
 
Rights in Iraq Through a Case Study of Current Intellectual Property Practices in Lebanon, Egypt, 
and Jordan, 6 J. MARSHALL L. SCHOOL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 250, 251 (2007). 
 7. Coalition Laws and Transition Arrangements During Occupation of Iraq, 98 AM. J. INT‘L L. 
REV. 601, 601 (Sean D. Murphy ed., 2004). 
 8. Sina Muscati, Terminator Technology: Protection of Patents or a Threat to the Patent 
System?, 45 IDEA 477, 505 (2005). 
 9. Liebert, supra note 2, at 221. 
 10. Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2371 (2009). 
 11. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Under the Supremacy 
Clause, treaties and statutes have equal weight. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). If a 
treaty and statute are deemed to conflict, the doctrine of ―implied repeal‖ is applied—wherein the 
latter adopted document prevails over the earlier one. Id. However, courts strive to harmonize treaties 
and statutes. See, e.g., Estate of Burghardt v. Comm‘r, 80 T.C. 705, 713 (1983). ―[T]he intention to 
abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to the Congress.‖ Menominee Tribe v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968). Implied repeal will only apply if there is no harmonious 
interpretation to the treaty and statute available. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933). 
 12. See A. Bryan Endres & Peter D. Goldsmith, Alternative Business Strategies in Weak 
Intellectual Property Environments: A Law and Economics Analysis of the Agro-Biotechnology Firm’s 
Strategic Dilemma, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 237, 248 (2007). ―The reality,‖ according to Endres and 
Goldsmith, ―is that many nations lack institutional controls, such as robust intellectual property laws 
and effective court systems to enforce intangible property rights and contractual arrangements.‖ Id. In 
Europe, biotech company patent claims directed at specific DNA sequences have been contentious. 
Gareth Morgan et al., Expert Analysis of Recent European Developments: Cargill v. Monsanto, 27 
BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 109, 112 (2008). Company claims that patentable gene sequences are the 
same kind of claims at issue in U.S. cases like Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). Germany, France, and Luxembourg all expressly bar patent protection of gene sequences. 
Morgan et al., supra, at 113. 
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Iraqi agricultural and patent issues both before and after the U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq, focusing on U.S. initiatives that affected the ability of 
Iraqi farmers to save seed. Finally, I will argue that U.S. efforts to prohibit 
Iraqis from saving seed undermine an agriculturally successful sovereign 
Iraq.  
II. THE BIOTECHNOLOGICAL PATENTS IN SAVED SEED  
Soybean and wheat plants patented by companies like Monsanto and 
Asgrow constitute the majority of the plants at issue in U.S. litigation over 
the farmers‘ right to save seed versus the companies‘ right to protect their 
patents.
13
 Patents protect aspects of seed companies‘ technology. For 
example, at issue in Monsanto v. McFarling
14
 were two Monsanto patents 
that allow for more efficient weed control by modifying the soybean plant 
so that it is resistant to herbicide.
15
 Monsanto‘s U.S. Patent No. 5,633,435 
(the ―‗435‖ patent) covers a plant cell in the soybean containing a DNA 
molecule that encodes a genetically modified enzyme.
16
 Monsanto‘s U.S. 
Patent No. 5,352,605 (the ―‗605‖ patent) covers a plant cell ―containing a 
genetic promoter sequence that facilitates a plant‘s production of the 
modified enzyme.‖17 This ‗605 patent protects the genetic trait in the seed 
developed by Monsanto.
18
 
The patented plants at issue are transgenic organisms—they have had a 
gene inserted, deleted, or replaced, allowing for the function of genes 
within the plant to be determined.
19
 ―These modifications have contributed 
to biological knowledge and agriculture by adding valuable traits to 
plants.‖20  
 
 
 13. See Marguerite A. Hutchinson, Moving Beyond the WTO: A Proposal to Adjudicate GMO 
Disputes in an International Environmental Court, 10 SAN DIEGO INT‘L L.J. 229, 236 (2008). 
 14. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
 15. Id. at 976. 
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Monsanto Co. v. Parr, 545 F. Supp. 2d 836, 838 (N.D. Ind. 2008).  
 19. Samantha A. Jameson, A Comparison of the Patentability and Patent Scope of 
Biotechnological Inventions in the United States and the European Union, 35 AIPLA Q.J. 193, 242–
43 (2007). 
 20. Id. at 243. One controversial biotech seed product is known as ‗Terminator,‘ sterile seed, or 
genetic use restriction technology (GURT). Patented in 1998, this genetic technology ―would make 
saving and replanting seeds to harvest a biological impossibility.‖ Richard Caplan, The Ongoing 
Debate Over Terminator Technology, 19 GEO. INT‘L ENVTL. L. REV. 751, 751 (2007). The 
Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (―FAO‖) found that GURT seeds posed a 
serious risk to farmers‘ security. Id. at 773. A former chairman of the FAO Council ―and recipient of 
the World Food Prize, wrote that: ‗In India . . . use of the terminator mechanism will be disastrous 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In 2002, Judge Raymond Clevenger of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit characterized the ascendancy of transgenic 
seeds, like Monsanto‘s Roundup Ready brand: ―[I]n only a few short years 
since their introduction, Roundup Ready seeds now account for at least 66 
percent of soybean acreage planted in the United States.‖21  
III. INTERNATIONAL TREATY-ENACTING LEGISLATION 
Several international treaties address the property interest in patentable 
plants and seeds as well as whether or not these interests should affect the 
ability of farmers to save seed. 
A. International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants and 
the Plant Variety Protection Act  
The International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(―UPOV‖) is an intergovernmental organization.22 Membership in the 
UPOV is purely voluntary.
23
 The United States is a UPOV member.
24
 Iraq 
 
 
from the socio-economic and biodiversity points of view, since over 80 percent of farmers plant their 
own farm-saved seeds.‘‖ Id. at 775. 
 21. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Clevenger, J., 
dissenting). 
 22. Welcome to the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, http:// 
www.upov.int/index_en.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2010). The UPOV is headquartered in Geneva, 
Switzerland. The international convention establishing the UPOV was adopted in Paris in 1961, and 
was revised in 1972, 1978, and 1991. The stated purpose of the Convention is to protect new varieties 
of plants via intellectual property right. Mission Statement of the International Union for the Protection 
of New Varieties of Plants, http://www.upov.int/en/about/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2010). 
 23. Patent Lens, Can IP Rights Protect Plants?, http://www.patentlens.net/daisy/patentlens/ 
1234.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2010). Unlike the World Trade Organization‘s TRIPS agreement, 
countries are ―not obliged to join UPOV as a result of their affiliation with any other organization or 
the ratification of any specific treaty.‖ Id.  
 24. MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NEW VARIETIES OF 
PLANTS 2 (2009), http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/en/about/members/pdf/pub423.pdf [hereinafter 
2009 MEMBER STATUS] (listing the status of members on October 22, 2009). The United States 
became a UPOV member on November 8, 1981 and became party to the most recently updated 
Convention Act (the 1991 Act) on February 22, 1999. The United States is a party to the 1991 Act 
with a stated reservation pursuant to article 35(2). Id. Article 35(2) provides a limited exception for 
party nations to make reservations to the Convention, as per article 35(1), no reservations to the 
Convention are permitted. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Mar. 
19, 1991, available at http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/en/publications/conventions /1991/pdf/ 
act1991.pdf [hereinafter UPOV]. The U.S. reservation to the 1991 Convention was for the United 
States to continue providing protection for ―varieties reproduced asexually . . . by an industrial 
property title other than a breeder‘s right, [which] shall have the right to continue to do so without 
applying this Convention to those varieties.‖ UPOV art. 35, ¶ 2(a). The 1991 Convention was entered 
into force with respect to the U.S. on Feb. 22, 1999. World Intellectual Property Organization, UPOV 
Notification No. 69 (Jan. 22, 1999), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/notdocs/en/upov/treaty_upov_69.html.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss3/5
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is not currently a member.
25
 Each state party to the UPOV is required to 
adopt measures necessary to implement the UPOV.
26
 The Plant Variety 
Protection Act (―PVPA‖)27 is U.S. legislation enacting the UPOV.28 
In 1970, Congress passed the PVPA to provide developers of new plant 
varieties with ―adequate encouragement‖ to yield new varieties for public 
benefit.
29
 Unlike patents under the Patent Act, ―but as permitted under the 
UPOV, the PVPA includes some important exceptions to a seed 
developer‘s control, such as a ‗farmer‘s exemption‘ allowing farmers to 
save seed from a proprietary crop.‖30 According to the Supreme Court, 
―[t]he PVPA extends patent-like protection to novel varieties of sexually 
reproduced plants (that is, plants grown from seed), which parallels the 
protection afforded asexually-reproduced plant varieties (that is, varieties 
reproduced by propagation or grafting) under Chapter 15 of the Patent 
Act.‖31 
The developer of a novel variety obtains PVPA coverage by acquiring 
a certificate of protection from the Plant Variety Protection Office.
32
 This 
confers on the owner the exclusive right for eighteen years to ―exclude 
others from selling the variety, or offering it for sale, or reproducing it, or 
importing it, or exporting it, or using it in producing (as distinguished 
from developing) a hybrid or different variety therefrom.‖33 
Congress enacted the PVPA to bring the United States into compliance 
with the UPOV.
34
 Article 15 of the UPOV recognizes exceptions to the 
 
 
 25. 2009 MEMBER STATUS, supra note 24. 
 26. UPOV art. 30. 
 27. PVPA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2371 (2006). 
 28. See Kesan, supra note 4, at 1090. ―The PVPA, which is based out of the international UPOV 
convention, has certain compulsory exceptions and certain optional exceptions; hence these 
differences between countries emerge.‖ Id. ―While the United States did not join UPOV until 1981, 
Congress enacted the PVPA eleven years earlier so as to be consistent with UPOV and in the process 
facilitate patent protection for plant breeders working at both a domestic and an international level.‖ 
Keith Aoki, Malthus, Mendel, and Monsanto: Intellectual Property and the Law and Politics of Global 
Food Supply: An Introduction, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 397, 421 (2004).  
 29. PVPA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2371. Before the PVPA was enacted, plants grown from seeds 
were statutorily excluded from patent protection under chapter 15 of the Patent Act. Asgrow Seed Co. 
v. Winterboer, 989 F.2d 478, 480 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 30. Dan L. Burk, DNA Rules: Legal and Conceptual Implications of Biological “Lock-Out” 
Systems, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1553, 1557 (2004). 
 31. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 181 (1995). 
 32. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2421, 2422, 2481-2483. 
 33. 7 U.S.C. § 2483. 
 34. Anne E. Crocker, Will Plants Finally Grow into Full Patent Protection on an International 
Level?—A Look at the History of U.S. and International Patent Law Regarding Patent Protection for 
Plants and the Likely Changes after the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer 
Hi-Bred, 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 251, 259 (2003). 
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breeder‘s rights.35 Article 15(1) lists compulsory exceptions: (1) acts done 
privately and for non-commercial purposes; (2) acts done for experimental 
purposes; and (3) acts done for the purposes of breeding other varieties.
36
 
Article 15(2) is an optional exception wherein a party-nation may, ―within 
reasonable limits and subject to the safeguarding of the legitimate interests 
of the breeder,‖ restrict breeders in order to permit farmers to save seeds of 
the protected plant for replanting purposes on their own land.
37
 
Interestingly, during the diplomatic conference to discuss the 1991 
amendments to the UPOV, the Netherlands proposed removing the 
paragraph 2 ―farmer‘s privilege‖ to save seed.38 The U.S. delegate stated 
that his delegation would find it difficult to establish such a limitation on 
the farmer‘s privilege.39 
Each ratifying state must give effect to the provisions of the UPOV.
40
 
Therefore, in order to participate in the UPOV, the United States was 
required to conform its plant variety protection law with the 1991 UPOV 
Act.
41
 On October 6, 2004, the United States complied by implementing 
legislation that led to the enactment of the Plant Variety Protection Act 
Amendments of 1994.
42
 In his letter of submittal recommending that the 
 
 
 35. UPOV art. 15.  
 36. Id. Under article 14 of the UPOV, the following acts require the authorization of the breeder 
with respect to propagating the protected plant material: (1) production or reproduction 
(multiplication); (2) conditioning for the purpose of propagation; (3) offering for sale; (4) selling or 
other marketing; (5) exporting; (6) importing; or (7) stocking the protected plant material for any of 
the above purposes. UPOV art. 14. 
 37. UPOV art. 15. 
 38. Summary Minutes, in INT‘L UNION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NEW VARIETIES OF PLANTS, 
RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE FOR THE REVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION 
FOR THE PROTECTION OF NEW VARIETIES OF PLANTS, GENEVA, 1991, at 352 (1992) [hereinafter 
Summary Minutes]. 
 39. Id. at 355. 
 40. UPOV art. 30. 
 41. Under article 2 of the 1991 UPOV, the United States has the flexibility of providing UPOV-
mandated plant protection by either Plant Variety Protection certificates, utility patents, or both. S. 
TREATY DOC. No. 104-17, at VII–VIII (1995); S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 105-15, at 3 (1998). The UPOV 
makes clear that member states can use any domestic legislative form of intellectual property 
protection law to carry out the UPOV mandates. UPOV arts. 2–4. The broad language of article 2, 
outlining the basic obligations of member nations, states only that each contracting nation ―shall grant 
and protect breeders‘ rights.‖ Id. When discussing the neutrality of article 2 in allowing member 
nations to choose the form of protection they will issue for plant varieties, minutes from the 
Diplomatic Conference for Revision of the International Convention reveal that UPOV drafters 
contemplated that ―the variety was to be considered as a host for the patent, whatever its purport might 
be.‖ Summary Minutes, supra note 38, at 212, 213. The United States delegation to this meeting added 
that the breeder did not have an unfettered right to decide for himself what type of protection to obtain 
in as much as ―[t]he breeder only had the right which was permitted by him by the laws of the country 
in which he obtained or sought to obtain protection. To that extent, the sovereign decision of member 
states on how to protect plant varieties should be maintained.‖ Id. at 215.  
 42. Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-349, 108 Stat. 3136 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss3/5
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1991 UPOV be transmitted to the Senate for ratification, Secretary of State 
Peter Tarnoff specifically noted to President Bill Clinton that the Act 
expressly permits member states to exclude farmers‘ practice of saving 
seeds from the reach of breeder rights.
43
  
Per the 1991 UPOV, the PVPA was amended in 1994 to state that any 
person who saves seed produced by or descended from protected seed, and 
who uses that seed in the production of crop on his own land, is not 
infringing on any PVPA-protected breeder right.
44
 Farmers can use this 
seed for their own future use, but cannot sell, trade, or transfer it to others 
for planting purposes.
45
 The PVPA also provides that a farmer can save 
seed for sale in limited circumstances.
46
  
The PVPA provides a more limited right to patent holders than the 
Patent Act because it applies only to sexually reproduced plants and 
contains research and farmer crop exceptions.
47
 ―Most notably, there are 
no [infringement] exemptions for . . . saving seed under a utility patent.‖48 
Despite variant scopes, the Supreme Court confirmed that the PVPA and 
the Patent Act do not conflict.
49
  
B. World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights 
The World Trade Organization‘s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (―TRIPS Agreement‖ or ―Agreement‖) bills 
itself as ―the most comprehensive multilateral agreement on intellectual 
 
 
(1994). 
 43. S. TREATY DOC. No. 104-17, at VI (1998). President Clinton accepted Tarnoff‘s submission 
and transmitted the 1991 UPOV Act—with the article 15(2) exception for saving seed—to the Senate 
with a recommendation for favorable consideration. Id. at III. 
 44. 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2009).  
[I]t shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person to save seed produced by the person 
from seed obtained, or descended from seed obtained, by authority of the owner of the variety 
for seeding purposes and use such saved seed in the production of a crop for use on the farm 
of the person, or for sale as provided in this section.  
Id. In interpreting this section of the statute in Asgrow, Justice Scalia began by acknowledging  
at the outset that it is quite impossible to make complete sense of the provision at issue here. 
One need go no further than the very first words of its title to establish that. Section 2543 
does not, as that title claims and the ensuing text says, reverse any ―[r]ight to save seed‖—
since nothing elsewhere in the Act remotely prohibits the saving of seed.  
Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 185–86 (1995) (footnote omitted). 
 45. 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2009). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Jameson, supra note 19, at 256. 
 48. J. E. M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int‘l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143 (2001). 
 49. Id. at 140. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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property.‖50 The Agreement sets minimum standards, allowing member 
states to provide more extensive protection of intellectual property at their 
discretion.
51
 The TRIPS Agreement requires member states to make 
patents available for all novel inventions, but provides three permissible 
exceptions to this basic rule of patentability.
52
 It is acceptable to exempt 
plants and animals, but the Agreement still requires some system of 
protection.
53
  
The Agreement requires that patents be available in areas of 
technology, including biotechnology.
54
 Indeed, the hallmark of TRIPS is 
the indiscriminate expansion of intellectual property protection.
55
 Article 
27 of TRIPS instructs Members to the Agreement to ―provide for the 
protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis 
system or by any combination thereof.‖56 Under TRIPS, bound countries 
must implement mechanisms facilitating an entity to claim legal rights in 
plants and plant products.
57
 In some countries, including the United States, 
―plants can be covered by patent claims provided that the patent 
applications are able to meet all of the necessary standards and 
requirements that exist in that country for patentability.‖58  
With respect to farmer versus patent owner rights, some member states 
have pushed for amendment to the TRIPS agreement. At the July 1999 
TRIPS Council session, the African Group
59
 proposed revising the 
 
 
 50. World Trade Organization, TRIPS: A More Detailed Overview of the Trips Agreement, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited June 2, 2010).  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  
Members may exclude plants and animals other than micro-organisms and essentially 
biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and 
microbiological processes. However, any country excluding plant varieties from patent 
protection must provide an effective sui generis system of protection. Moreover, the whole 
provision is subject to review four years after entry into force of the Agreement.  
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27.3(b), Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1208 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. The other 
permissible exceptions are for inventions contrary to morality, and inventions related to the diagnosis, 
therapy, and surgical treatment of humans or animals. Id. 
 54. Jameson, supra note 19, at 197. 
 55. Chidi Oguamanam, Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Genetic Resources: Farmers’ 
Rights and Food Security of Indigenous and Local Communities, 11 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 273, 280 
(2006). 
 56. TRIPS art. 27.3(b).  
 57. Id. 
 58. Patent Lens 101: Initiative for Open Innovation, http://www.patentlens.net/daisy/patentlens/ 
1234.html (last visited June 2, 2010).  
 59. World Trade Organization, Groups in the Agriculture Negotiations, http://www.wto.org/ 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss3/5
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Agreement to provide for ―the protection of the innovations of indigenous 
and local farming communities in developing countries‖ and ―the 
continuation of the traditional farming practices including the right to 
save, exchange and save seeds, and sell their harvest.‖60 The United States 
opposed this action.
61
 The Council did not act on the African Group‘s 
proposal.
62
 
The TRIPS Agreement applies to all World Trade Organization 
(―WTO‖) members, but the Agreement gives countries varying time 
periods to delay application of TRIPS provisions.
63
 The transition periods 
vary according to a country‘s classification as developed, transition, or 
least-developed.
64
 The Agreement does not require member states to adopt 
identical rules on protection of intellectual property—it is a ―minimum 
standards‖ agreement.65 The United States has been a member of the WTO 
since January 1, 1995 and is thus a party to the TRIPS Agreement.
66
 Iraq 
applied for accession into the WTO in 2004, and in 2008, a WTO group 
published its support for Iraq‘s accession.67 
 
 
english/tratop_e/agric_e/negoti_groups_e.htm (last visited June 2, 2010). The following countries 
comprise the ―African Group‖ coalition within the WTO: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Côte d‘Ivoire, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Djibouti, 
Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Id. 
 60. African Group, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Taking 
Forward the Review of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS agreement, IP/C/W/404, June 26, 2003, http:// 
docsonline.wto.org (follow ―simple search‖; then search ―Document Symbol‖ for ―IP/C/W/404‖; then 
follow ―Preview (HTML)‖ hyperlink), as discussed in Paul Kuruk, Goading a Reluctant Dinosaur: 
Mutual Recognition Agreements As a Policy Response to the Misappropriation of Foreign Traditional 
Knowledge in the United States, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 629, 679 (2007). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. World Trade Organization, TRIPS Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm#Who‘sSigned (last visited Feb. 11, 2010) [hereinafter TRIPS FAQ].  
 64. Id. Developed countries were granted a transition period of one year. Developing countries 
were allowed four years. Transitional economies (in the process of transformation from centrally 
planned into market economies) were allowed four years. Least-developed countries were granted an 
eleven-year transition period. Id.  
 65. TRIPS FAQ, supra note 63.  
 66. World Trade Organization, Member Information—The United States of America and the 
WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/usa_e.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).  
 67. World Trade Organization, Working Party Reviews Iraq’s Trade Legislation, Apr. 2, 2008, 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news08_e/acc_iraq_april08_e.htm. WTO working party members 
argued that Iraq‘s participation in the WTO would contribute to its integration into the world economy. 
Id. The WTO working party members assessed Iraq‘s conformity with WTO principles. Id. Iraq 
provided the working party with information on its trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, 
specific to show Iraqi compliance with TRIPS. Id. In terms of the next step in Iraq obtaining 
membership into the WTO, the working party specified that ―Iraq will update its legislative action 
plan, as appropriate, and will continue providing information to members.‖ Id.  
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C. World Intellectual Property Organization  
The World Intellectual Property Organization (―WIPO‖) ―is a 
specialized agency of the United Nations‖ and is another organization that 
recognizes patent protection for plant and seed-based inventions.
68
 WIPO 
and the WTO have a cooperative agreement, coordinating notification and 
implementation of laws and regulations.
69
 WIPO passed the Patent Law 
Treaty to harmonize international patent applications.
70
 WIPO also 
instituted a Development Agenda in 2004 to consider ―how WIPO policy 
decisions influence the developing world.‖71 WIPO‘s Development 
Agenda offers developing countries the opportunity to argue for limited 
intellectual property protection of new technologies.
72
 The United States 
and Iraq are both WIPO member states.
73
 However, Iraq is not a 
contracting party to the Patent Law Treaty.
74
 The United States has signed 
the Patent Law Treaty, but as of yet, no enacting legislation has given the 
treaty domestic force of law.
75
 
D. 2001 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture 
The Commission on Genetic Resources for Feed and Agriculture 
(―FAO‖) adopted the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
 
 
 68. World Intellectual Property Organization, What is WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/ 
en/what_is_wipo.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2010). 
 69. Agreement Between the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade 
Organization, Dec. 22, 1995, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/TRIPs_e/intel3_e.htm. 
 70. World Intellectual Property Organization, International Treaties and Conventions on 
Intellectual Property, in WIPO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK: POLICY, LAW AND USE 301 (2d 
ed. 2004), available at http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/iprm/pdf/ch5.pdf#plt. 
 71. Jason A. Barron, Note, Genetic Use Restriction Technologies: Do the Potential 
Environmental Harms Outweigh the Economic Benefits?, 20 GEO. INT‘L ENVTL. L. REV. 271, 295 
(2008). 
 72. Id.  
Because the Development Agenda is governed by the consensus system, changes would have 
to be agreed upon by all members. This would mean that developing nations would have to 
convince countries like the United States that . . . technologies that create a private IP right 
and/or create an environmental harm greater than any foreseeable benefit should be restricted. 
In the Development Agenda talks, developed nations have shown little support of any 
proposal that would restrict intellectual property rights.  
Id.  
 73. World Intellectual Property Organization, Member States, http://www.wipo.int/members/en/ 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2010). 
 74. World Intellectual Property Organization, Contracting Parties, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ 
en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=4 (last visited Feb. 11, 2010). 
 75. World Intellectual Property Organization, Treaties Database—Contracting Parties, http:// 
www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Remarks.jsp?cnty_id=1462C (last visited Feb. 11, 2010). 
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Food and Agriculture (―Treaty‖) in November 2001.76 The Treaty came 
into force on June 29, 2004 after ratification by forty governments.
77
 The 
FAO states that the objectives of the Treaty are the conservation and 
sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture.
78
 
Unlike other treaties, the FAO places greater emphasis on farmers‘ rights 
than on the need to protect biotechnological breeders.
79
 The FAO Treaty 
explicitly states that it is not to be interpreted to ―limit any rights that 
farmers have to save, use, exchange or sell farm-saved seed.‖80 However, 
the FAO Treaty leaves the right of farmers to use saved seed to the sole 
discretion of national governments.
81
 Iraq is not a party to the FAO 
Treaty.
82
 The United States signed the Treaty on January 11, 2002, but has 
not ratified, acceded to, or enacted the Treaty.
83
 
 
 
 76. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., FACT SHEET NO. 8: HISTORY OF THE TREATY 1, 
available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/agp/planttreaty/factsheets/fs08_en.pdf.  
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. Comm‘n on Genetic Resources for Food & Agric., Food & Agric. Org., United Nations, 
Biodiversity for a World without Hunger, http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/nr/documents/ 
CGRFA/commissionfactsheet.pdf. The Treaty focuses on regulating all plant genetic material for food 
and agriculture to ensure continued ability to ―feed the people.‖ The FAO Treaty defines ―plant 
genetic resources‖ as ―any genetic material of plant origin of actual or potential value for food and 
agriculture.‖ International Treaty on Plant and Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/ 
011/i0510e/i0510e.pdf. The FAO website argues that ―[t]he future of agriculture depends on 
international cooperation and on the open exchange of the crops and their genes.‖ Id. 
 79. HISTORY OF THE TREATY, supra note 76. The concept of ―Farmers‘ Rights‖ was initially 
proposed by a Canadian NGO as a ―new type of collective intellectual property rights, meant to 
counter and be a mirror image of plant breeders‘ rights.‖ Keith Aoki & Kennedy Luvai, Reclaiming 
“Common Heritage” Treatment in the International Plant Genetic Resources Regime Complex, 2007 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 35, 43.  
 80. International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture art. 9.3, June 29, 
2004, available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/it/ITPGRe.pdf. Article 9.3 states that ―[n]othing in this 
Article shall be interpreted to limit any rights that farmers have to save, use, exchange and sell farm-
saved seed/propagating material, subject to national law and as appropriate.‖ Id. Further, in the 
Preamble, the FAO Treaty specifies that the Contracting Parties affirm 
the rights recognized in this Treaty to save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved seed and other 
propagating material, and to participate in decision-making regarding, and in the fair and 
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from, the use of plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture, are fundamental to the realization of Farmers‘ Rights, as well as the promotion of 
Farmers‘ Rights at national and international levels.  
Id. See also Charles R. McManis, Teaching Current Trends and Future Developments in Intellectual 
Property, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 855, 874 n.89 (2008). 
 81. Aoki & Luvai, supra note 79, at 53–54. 
 82. Legal Office Treaties, International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture, http://www.fao.org/Legal/TREATIES/033s-e.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2010). 
 83. Id. 
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E. United Nations Convention on Biodiversity—the Cartagena Protocol 
The United Nations identifies the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(―CBD‖) as the ―key global instrument for the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity, and for the fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic resources.‖84 The CBD 
was formed during the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development‘s ―Earth Summit‖ in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.85 The CBD 
ushered in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety on September 11, 2003.
86
 
The Cartagena Protocol aims to ensure an adequate level of protection in 
the use and international transfer of modified organisms resulting from 
biotechnology.
87
  
The U.S. Department of Agriculture noted that although the United 
States is not party to the CBD or the Cartagena Protocol, it did participate 
in negotiation of the text of the Protocol.
88
 Indeed, the United States was a 
member of the unofficial, so-called ―Miami Group,‖ representing the 
major exporters of genetically modified seed and crops.
89
 The U.S. interest 
in negotiation was to enable free trade of genetically modified product, 
including transgenic seed, without additional U.N. bureaucratic 
procedure.
90
 Like the United States, Iraq is not a signatory to the 
Cartagena Protocol.
91
 
 
 
 84. Kofi Annan, Message from Kofi Annan, THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY FROM 
CONCEPTION TO IMPLEMENTATION: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE OCCASION OF THE 10TH 
ANNIVERSARY OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 1 (2004), 
available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/CBD-10th-anniversary.pdf. 
 85. Id. at 7.  
 86. Hamdallah Zedan, Introduction and Congratulations: Message from Hamdallah Zedan, The 
Convention on Biological Diversity from Conception to Implementation—Historical Perspectives on 
the Occasion of the 10th Anniversary of the Entry Into Force of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (2004). 
 87. Convention on Biological Diversity, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Jan. 29, 2000, 
available at http://www.cbd.int/biosafety/articles.shtml?a=cpb-01. 
 88. U.S. Dep‘t of State Bureau of Oceans, Int‘l Envtl. & Scientific Affairs, Fact Sheet: 
Cartagena Protocal on Biosafety, July 21, 2003, http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/factsheets/biosafety. 
asp. 
 89. AARON COSBEY & STAS BURGIEL, THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY: AN 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS (2000), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/biosafety.pdf.  
 90. Id. 
 91. Convention on Biological Diversity, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Status of Ratification 
and Entry into Force, http://www.cbd.int/biosafety/signinglist.shtml (last visited June 2, 2010). 
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IV. U.S. ANALYSIS 
The U.S. courts‘ current position—that legislation enacting 
international treaties is consistent with protection afforded to patent 
holders by the Patent Act and does not mandate farmers‘ rights to save 
seed—was not inevitable.92 The courts might have instead decided that 
when Congress amended the PVPA to reflect the 1991 UPOV, Congress 
evidenced intent to afford farmers more protection.
93
 Nevertheless, the 
outcome of U.S. cases has been decidedly in favor of seed patent-
holders.
94
  
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court held that live 
organisms are patentable.
95
 Diamond confirmed the patentability of 
genetically engineered organisms.
96
 After the Diamond decision, seed 
companies began to use civil litigation to more aggressively protect their 
property rights under the PVPA.
97
 
 
 
 92. Charles C. P. Rories, Does the U.S.P.T.O. Have Authority to Grant Patents for Novel 
Varieties of Sexually Reproducing Plants?, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 737, 750-51 (2001). 
 93. Id.  
Congress has not enacted a large number of laws pertaining to protecting sexually 
reproducing plant varieties; the only significant amendments to the PVPA of 1970 were made 
in 1994, primarily to bring the PVPA into conformity with the 1991 UPOV Act. However . . . 
in both the 1970 and the 1994 statutes, Congress specifically provided exceptions to the scope 
of protection given for a sexually reproduced plant variety—for example, the ‗crop 
exemption‘ that permits a farmer to save seed he has produced from protected seed and use it 
for planting the following season, without infringing. . . . Title 35 does not provide these 
exemptions to the protection provided by a patent for a sexually reproduced plant, and owners 
of patents for such plants may prevent farmers from saving and using protected seed, and stop 
breeders from using protected varieties to produce new varieties. In deciding the Pioneer v. J. 
E. M. Ag Supply cases, the district court and the Federal Circuit did not regard these 
differences as significant conflicts between the two forms of protection; however, the Court 
could view them as evidence that in enacting the PVPA, Congress created a specific 
regulatory scheme for protecting sexually reproduced plant varieties that has been abridged 
by the U.S.P.T.O.‘s decision to grant patents that also provide exclusive rights for sexually 
reproduced plant varieties. The legislative record of the PVPA indicates that at the time that 
the PVPA was enacted, Congress did not recognize any existing regulatory mechanism for 
protecting sexually reproducing plant varieties.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
 94. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  
 95. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 303 (1980). 
 96. Id. at 305–06. The Court found that ―anything under the sun that is made by man‖ is 
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id. at 309. Jameson notes that the relevant distinction 
for patentability in Diamond is between products of nature and human-made inventions. Jameson, 
supra note 19, at 244. 
 97. Elizabeth I. Winston, What If Seeds Were Not Patentable?, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 321, 330 
(2008). Winston notes:  
The agricultural industry is a highly concentrated field with the majority of the economy 
controlled by three companies. Focusing in on the behavior of one such player, Monsanto, 
and one seed, Roundup Ready soybean seed, provides a window into the revolution in the 
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In Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, the Supreme Court interpreted 
actions taken by Winterboer, a farmer, as ―a step in marketing‖ Asgrow‘s 
protected seeds
98—where such a marketing step contraindicates the limited 
circumstances that the PVPA allows farmers to save seed for sale.
99
 Prior 
to the Asgrow decision, the PVPA was generally interpreted to mean that a 
farmer could save up to half the crop of a protected variety for planting.
100
 
The 1994 PVPA amendment in conjunction with the Asgrow decision 
reframed the exemption to mean that a farmer could only save the amount 
of seed of a protected variety necessary to plant on their own farm, based 
on past production history. That ―a farmer [may] save[] seeds to replant 
his acreage, but [if he] for some reason changes his plans, . . . [and] instead 
sell[s] those seeds for replanting under the terms set forth,‖101 that action is 
not allowed.  
In 2001, the Supreme Court affirmed that the Patent Act‘s broad scope 
of patent protection included plants.
102
 In J. E. M. Ag Supply, the Court 
considered an appeal taken from a judgment for Pioneer, the patent-
holders of hybrid corn seeds.
103
 The petitioners argued that Pioneer‘s 
patent was invalid because it was issued under the Patent Act.
104
 
Petitioners claimed that the PVPA was the exclusive means for protection 
of plant life.
105
 The Court, however, found that newly developed plant 
 
 
seed industry that has been brought about by the innovative use of private ordering to protect 
seed. 
Id. (citations omitted). Winston describes Monsanto‘s efforts to join the ―inner circle‖ through 
aggressive and restrictive licensing of its technology. Id. Per Winston, companies like Monsanto can 
protect their patents under either the Patent Act or via breach of contract (claiming that farmers violate 
their licensing agreements when they save seed). Id. at 335. However, Winston does not consider 
potential implications of treaty supremacy from the United States‘ participation in the UPOV or other 
organizations with seed-saving provisions. 
 98. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer (Asgrow II), 513 U.S. 179, 182 (1995). The marketing action 
taken by the Winterboers was the derivation of  
a sizable portion of their income from ―brown-bag‖ sales of their crops to other farmers to use 
as seed. A brown-bag sale occurs when a farmer purchases seed from a seed company, such 
as Asgrow, plants the seed in his own fields, harvests the crop, cleans it, and then sells the 
reproduced seed to other farmers (usually in nondescript brown bags) for them to plant as 
crop seed on their own farms.  
Id. 
 99. Id. at 186.  
 100. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer (Asgrow I), 989 F.2d 478 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 101. Asgrow II, 513 U.S. at 191. 
 102. J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int‘l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001). 
 103. Id. at 124. 
 104. Id. at 129. 
 105. Id. at 129. Petitioners argued that Pioneer‘s plant patent under 35 U.S.C. § 101 was invalid 
because both the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (―PPA‖) and the PVPA are more specific to plants than 35 
U.S.C. § 101 and therefore carve out subject matter for special treatment. Id. The Court noted that 
petitioners favored a holding that the PVPA was the only means of protecting plants because the 
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breeds were validly protected by the Patent Act and that the PVPA did not 
narrow the scope of protection afforded to patent-holders.
106
  
In April 2008, the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Indiana in Monsanto Co. v. Parr, granted an injunction against a seed 
cleaning business for infringing Monsanto‘s ‗605 patented Roundup 
Ready technology.
107
 Parr operated a mobile seed and grain cleaning 
business, scheduling appointments with farmers around the Lafayette, 
Indiana area to clean their seed.
108
 Soybean seed is cleaned in order to 
prepare it for replanting.
109
 Parr‘s cleaning service was thus a means for 
farmers to save seed from one crop harvest and replant those seeds for 
future crop.
110
 The court granted Monsanto‘s request for an injunction 
against Parr.
111
 The court found that Parr‘s seed cleaning services, in 
conjunction with his verbal representations to farmers that the Supreme 
Court‘s opinion in Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer permitted farmers to 
save and replant their seeds, illegally induced farmers to infringe 
Monsanto‘s patent.112 
 
 
PVPA provides exemptions for research and for farmers to save seeds for replanting—exemptions not 
present in the Title 35 utility patent protections. Id. at 29 n.1. The PPA protects asexually reproducing 
plants. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164 (2008). ―Asexual reproduction occurs by grafting, budding, or the like, 
and produces an offspring with a genetic combination identical to that of the single parent—essentially 
a clone.‖ J. E. M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 132. 
 106. J. E. M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 145. Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas stated that the 
argument that the PVPA evidenced Congress‘ intent to deny broader utility patent protection for 
certain sexually reproduced plants was unavailing for two reasons:  
First, nowhere does the PVPA purport to provide the exclusive statutory means of protecting 
sexually reproduced plants. Second, the PVPA and § 101 can easily be reconciled. Because it 
is harder to qualify for a utility patent than for a Plant Variety Protection (PVP) certificate, it 
only makes sense that utility patents would confer a greater scope of protection. 
Id. at 138. Justice Breyer dissented with Justice Stevens joining. Id. at 147. Justice Breyer argued that 
the Patent Act did not cover the kinds of plants at issue. According to Justice Breyer, Congress 
intended the more specific statute (the PVPA) to exclude patent protection under § 101 for plants to 
which the more specific statute refers. Breyer noted that prior to the enactment of the PVPA, a special 
Presidential Commission commented on the special problems raised by plant protection. Id. at 153. 
That Commission favored the development of a totally new plant protection scheme, recommending 
that ―all provisions in the patent statute for plant patents be deleted.‖ Id. (quoting PRESIDENT‘S 
COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS, S. DOC. No. 
90-5, at 20–21 (1st Sess. 1967)). Breyer also notes the ―important‖ exception to breeder‘s exclusive 
rights in the PVPA—the uninfringed right of farmers to save and replant seeds. Id. at 154. 
 107. Monsanto Co. v. Parr, 545 F. Supp. 2d 836 (N.D. Ind. 2008). 
 108. Id. at 839. As the Court explained, seed cleaning ―is a process where a harvested crop is run 
through a mechanical cleaner that sifts rash such as stems, leaves, dirt, and broken/split seed from the 
whole seed.‖ Id.  
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 840. 
 111. Id. at 844. 
 112. Id. at 842–43. 
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As is the case in many patent infringement cases involving saved seed, 
Monsanto required farmers to sign a licensing agreement.
113
 The licensing 
agreement in Parr forbade growers from saving seed grown from their 
Roundup Ready crops or otherwise using saved Roundup Ready seed ―for 
replanting in subsequent seasons.‖114 According to courts, these licensing 
agreements are binding and restrict the party purchasing the seed from 
saving seed, irrespective of rights that might have been due farmers under 
the PVPA.
115
  
For example, the Federal Circuit in McFarling v. Monsanto found that 
the Monsanto license‘s prohibition on saving seed did not impermissibly 
broaden the scope of its patent or constitute patent misuse.
116
 The court 
characterized the PVPA and the Patent Act as ―complementary,‖ providing 
different rights and privileges.
117
 According to the court, ―the right to save 
seed of plants registered under the PVPA does not impart the right to save 
seed of plants patented under the Patent Act.‖118 
 
 
 113. Id. at 838. 
 114. Id. The Roundup Ready agreement in Parr restricted the use of the purchased seeds to 
planting within a single commercial crop in one growing season. Id. 
 115. See Showmaker v. Advanta, 411 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit found that the purchasing agreement ―contractually prohibited its buyers from saving 
or selling, for seed purposes, any grain products from its seed.‖ Id. at 1369. Interestingly, the 
Showmaker court looked to the precise language in Advanta‘s licensing agreement to find that the 
PVPA was not implicated. Id. at 1368. ―Advanta did not reference the PVPA, any issued PVPA 
certificates, or any pending applications for plant variety protection,‖ nor did the license agreement use 
the specific terms of art that ―notify prospective users that the PVPA‘s protections apply.‖ Id. The 
court identified the phrases ―Unauthorized Propagation Prohibited‖ and ―Unauthorized Seed 
Multiplication Prohibited‖ as ―precise statutory terms‖ giving rise to notice of PVPA protection. Id. at 
1369. Showmaker‘s complaint stating that the Advanta licensing agreement language was sufficiently 
similar to PVPA phrasing, was dismissed. Id. at 1368. Because Advanta did not have a patent or PVPA 
certification on its seed, Showmaker sought to show that Advanta‘s licensing language impermissibly 
gave farmers notice that Advanta had rights under federal PVPA law. See id. at 1367. The court found 
that the contract language restricted Showmaker‘s use of Advanta‘s seeds because Advanta‘s license 
was deemed not to implicate the ―precise statutory terms‖ of the PVPA. Id. at 1369.  
 116. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1298–99 (Fed. Cir. 2002). On January 7, 2008, 
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case. McFarling v. Monsanto Co., 552 U.S. 1096 (2008). 
This followed the Federal Circuit‘s affirmation of a holding against McFarling, finding the farmer 
guilty of patent infringement, enjoining him from using the seed and awarding Monsanto $375,000 in 
damages. Monsanto, 302 F.3d at 1300; Corporate Report: Monsanto Co., SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., 
Jan. 8, 2008, at 2D. The license for the use of the patented seed restricted farmers from using the seeds 
for more than one season. Monsanto, 302 F.3d at 1293. Monsanto cites J. E. M. Ag Supply‘s finding 
that plants and seeds are patentable under § 101, ―independent of and in addition to rights under the 
PVPA.‖ Id. at 1299 (citing J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int‘l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143–
44 (2001)). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. In another case in which the defendant farmer argued against Monsanto‘s Technology 
Agreement, the farmer argued that the patent or a gene sequence does not ―entitle the holder of the 
patent to enforce its grant of exclusivity against growers of plant varieties that contain the gene 
sequence.‖ Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Mary Ann Liebert has also 
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V. IRAQ, PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION, AND SAVING SEED 
The political future of Iraq is uncertain. What is certain, however, is 
that the people of Iraq will continue to rely on their agricultural sector for 
the foreseeable future. ―Revitalizing a war-torn agricultural sector is 
essential to establishing a landscape in which peace may flourish.‖119 
Focus on Iraq‘s agricultural sector will benefit economic growth, social 
stability, and individual income—in addition to addressing food security 
for the masses.
120
  
A. Pre-2003 Invasion 
In the late 1970s, more than half of Iraq‘s total labor force was 
employed in the agriculture sector, contributing approximately eight 
percent of the country‘s gross domestic product.121 Iraq‘s attempts to 
develop the agriculture industry (investing more than four billion dollars 
over a decade) proved ineffective.
122
 As the oil sector grew, the number of 
Iraqis working in agriculture decreased.
123
 Iraq‘s ―fruitless disregard‖ for 
its agricultural sector was evidenced by increasing dependence on food 
imports.
124
 Lack of up-to-date farming equipment and severe droughts 
further impinged Iraq‘s ability to support any resurgence in the 
agricultural sector.
125
 The first Gulf War, resultant sanctions, and the 
dictatorial control of Saddam Hussein produced significant food 
shortages.
126
  
 
 
summarized David‘s argument that Monsanto‘s patent covers the gene sequence, not the plants 
themselves. Liebert, supra note 2, at 221. In David‘s case, the gene sequence conveyed soybean 
resistance to the Roundup herbicide. 516 F.3d at 1011–12. David was a commercial farmer who signed 
a Technology Agreement with Monsanto. Id. at 1012. The Agreement stated that farmers must 
purchase new Roundup Ready seeds each harvesting season, rather than saving seeds from previous 
years‘ harvests, as they normally would. Id. David was ordered by the district court to pay Monsanto 
$786,989.43 in damages, though the appellate court remanded for a new damage inquiry. Id. at 1013, 
1018–20. Monsanto claimed that David planted patented Monsanto soybeans that were improperly 
saved from the previous year‘s harvest. Id. at 1012. The district court found that David had ―willfully 
infringed‖ Monsanto‘s patent by ―planting saved seed from a prior year‘s crop.‖ Id. at 1013. 
 119. Kevin S. Cox, Note, Planting Peace: Agriculture and Post-War Reconstruction in Iraq, 10 
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 541, 543 (2005).  
 120. Id. at 542–43. 
 121. Id. at 545. 
 122. Id. In 1986, the agriculture sector had not increased its contribution to Iraq‘s total GDP. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. Cox reports that Iraq was agriculturally self-sufficient in the 1950s, but by the 1980s food 
imports accounted for twenty-two percent of all imports. Id. at 545–46. 
 125. Id. at 546. 
 126. Id. at 546–50. 
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B. Coalition Provisional Authority 
The Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq (―CPA‖) governed the 
country in the interim between U.S. invasion and the June 30, 2004 re-
declaration of Iraqi sovereignty.
127
 The Transitional Administrative Law 
was the supreme law of Iraq during the transitional period between CPA 
control and Iraqi self-governance.
128
 CPA orders retain the force of law in 
Iraq unless overturned by a democratically elected Iraqi legislature.
129
 
Among the stated initiatives undertaken by the CPA were to ―ensure food 
security‖ and ―to lay the foundation for an open economy by drafting . . . 
intellectual property laws and streamlining existing commercial codes and 
regulations.‖130  
On April 26, 2004, CPA Administrator L. Paul Bremer issued Order 
Number 81 (―Order 81‖ or ―Order‖).131 The ―Patent, Industrial Design, 
Undisclosed Information, Integrated Circuits and Plant Variety Law‖ 
noted that the outstanding Iraqi Patent and Industrial Design Law did not 
meet ―current internationally-recognized standards of protection.‖132 Order 
81 amended patent owner‘s rights to expand owner ability to prevent any 
use of product without patent owner authorization.
133
 The Order provides 
 
 
 127. Press Release, Coalition Provisional Authority, Coalition Provisional Authority Historical 
Accomplishments 2003–2004 (June 28, 2004), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/pressreleases/ 
20040628_historic_review_cpa.doc. 
 128. Id. at 45. 
 129. Coalition Provisional Authority, Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the 
Transitional Period, Mar. 8, 2004, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html. 
 130. Press Release, Coalition Provisional Authority, supra note 127, at 4. 
 131. COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 81: PATENT, INDUSTRIAL DESIGN, 
UNDISCLOSED INFORMATION, INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AND PLANT VARIETY LAW (2004), available at 
http://trade.gov/static/iraq_memo81.pdf. An overview of CPA orders affecting Iraqi commercial law 
from the U.S. embassy in Iraq identifies that Order 81  
amends Iraq‘s patent and industrial design law to protect new ideas in any field of technology 
that relates to a product or manufacturing processes. The amendments permit companies in 
Iraq, or in countries that are members of a relevant treaty to which Iraq is a party, to register 
patents in Iraq. The amendments grant the patent owner the right to prevent any person who 
has not obtained the owner‘s authorization from exploiting the patented product or process for 
twenty years from the date of the patent‘s registration in Iraq. The amendments also allow 
individuals and companies to register industrial designs.  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, OVERVIEW OF CPA ORDERS AFFECTING IRAQI COMMERCIAL LAW 
(Oct. 28, 2004), available at http://www.trade.gov/static/iraq_cpaoverview.pdf. 
 132. COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 81, supra note 131, at 1. See also 
Theodore W. Kassinger & Dylan J. Williams, Commercial Law Reform Issues in the Reconstruction of 
Iraq, 33 GA. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 217, 224 (2004). The authors state that CPA Order 81 provided Iraq 
―with a modern industrial property law.‖ Id.  
 133. COALITION PROVISION AUTHORITY, ORDER NUMBER 81, art. 12, available at http://www. 
cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20040426_CPAORD_81_Patents_Law.pdf. See also Al-Dajani, supra note 6, 
at 255–56. Al-Dajani notes that CPA Order 81 renamed the Iraqi Patent and Industrial Designs Laws 
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for plant variety registration, and for the first time codifies a concept of 
ownership of biological material in Iraqi law.
134
 The Order also 
enumerates acts, with respect to the propagation of registered plant 
varieties that require the authorization of the breeder.
135
 Specifically, 
production, reproduction, or multiplication; stocking; or conditioning for 
the purposes of propagation are prohibited absent authorization of the 
breeder.
136
 Any part of the plant obtained through propagation of the 
protected variety (including the seeds of the protected variety) is subject to 
those restricted uses.
137
 
Order 81 goes on to say that varieties ―essentially derived‖ from the 
registered plant variety, varieties ―not clearly distinguishable‖ from the 
registered variety, and ―varieties whose production requires the repeated 
use of the protected variety‖ are subject to the same protection given the 
initial registered variety.
138
 Under the Order, the breeder‘s rights extend to 
acts of others in ―further propagation‖ of the plant variety.139 
Order 81 explicitly makes law the proposition that farmers are 
prohibited from reusing seeds of protected varieties.
140
 The publication 
Grain stated in a 2005 press release that the plant variety provisions of 
CPA Order 81 have the practical effect of prohibiting Iraqi farmers from 
saving seeds for their own reuse or replanting.
141
  
 
 
and Regulations (No. 65 of 1970) to ―Patents, Industrial Design, Undisclosed Information, Integrated 
Circuits and Plant Variety Law.‖ According to Al-Dajani, Order 81 defines the term of a patent as ten 
years, though, as of 2007, the Iraqi patent office had yet to accept applications after the 2003 invasion. 
Id. at 255. Al-Dajani further notes that historically, ―[i]ntellectual property piracy runs rampant in the 
Middle East,‖ and ―[m]any Arab countries, regardless of WTO membership, are classified in the 
United States Trade Representative (―USTR‖) Special 301 report under either the priority watch list or 
the watch list.‖ Id. at 256. 
 134. COALITION PROVISION AUTHORITY, ORDER NUMBER 81, art. 3, available at http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/regulations/20040426_CPAORD_81_Patents_Law.pdf.  
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. art. 14. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. See also Laura Nader, Law and the Theory of Lack, 28 HASTINGS INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 
191, 203 (2005). Professor Nader argues that the CPA‘s orders ―give preference to U.S. corporations 
over the development of Iraqi economy.‖ Id. Nader characterizes Order 81 as prohibiting Iraqis from 
saving seed, finding that under the Order, Iraqis are only allowed to plant seed from licensed, 
authorized U.S. distributors. Id. She quotes one Iraqi as saying, ―the day will come, sooner rather than 
later, when the Iraqis will shred Bremer‘s law, soak them in water and offer them to Bremer to drink.‖ 
Id. 
 140. COALITION PROVISION AUTHORITY, ORDER NUMBER 81, art. 15, available at http://www. 
cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20040426_CPAORD_81_Patents_Law.pdf (―Farmers shall be prohibited 
from re-using seeds of protected varieties or any variety mentioned in items 1 and 2 of paragraph (C) 
of Article 14 of this Chapter.‖). 
 141. GRAIN, AGAINST THE GRAIN, IRAQ‘S NEW PATENT LAW: A DECLARATION OF WAR 
AGAINST FARMERS (2004), http://www.grain.org/articles/?id=6 (follow ―available in PDF‖ hyperlink). 
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C. U.S. Government Initiatives 
The U.S. Agency for International Development (―USAID‖) has taken 
the lead in efforts to rebuild Iraq, and to this end, developed the 
Agriculture Reconstruction and Development for Iraq (―ARDI‖) 
program.
142
 Part of the ARDI reconstruction work focused on stimulating 
agricultural production through introduction of equipment, fertilizer, and 
seed to Iraq.
143
 
The U.S. military also distributed wheat seed in Iraq as part of 
―Operation Amber Waves.‖144 U.S. soldiers stationed near Baghdad 
distributed hundreds of tons of seed and fertilizer as part of this 
initiative.
145
 It is unclear what kind of seed was supplied to Iraqi farmers. 
In particular, it is unclear whether the seed distributed by Operation 
Amber Waves was patent-protected biotech company seed. 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (―USDA‖) stated that Iraq has the 
resources to re-develop a successful agricultural sector, so long as Iraqi 
leadership addresses the technological aspect, which is ―still in the 
1980s.‖146 
D. Iraqi Outcomes 
1. Patent/Treaty Interpretation 
Professor Elizabeth Winston argues that the United States has the most 
expansive protection scheme for agricultural biotechnology in the 
 
 
See also Dave Whyte, The Crimes of Neo-liberal Rule in Occupied Iraq, 47 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 
177, 181 (2007). Whyte claims that the CPA envisaged Iraq‘s membership in the WTO as a central 
aspect of its economic reform. Id. According to Whyte, Order 81 was part of this plan and ―effectively 
outlawed the informal sharing of farm seed supply system that has survived in Iraqi farming for years. 
The order forced farmers to use the protected varieties sold to them by their ‗owners,‘ the trans-
national bio-firms, in line with the WTO patent regime.‖ Id. 
 142. Cox, supra note 119, at 553. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. at 556. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Review Iraqi Agriculture: From Oil for Food to the Future of Iraqi Production, Agriculture, 
and Trade: Hearing Before the Comm. on Agriculture, 108th Cong. 35–36 (2004) (statement of H. Lee 
Schatz, Special Counsel for Iraq Reconstruction, Foreign Agricultural Service, U.S. Dep‘t of 
Agriculture). Schatz went on to testify that the USDA had ―supported representatives of the U.S. 
wheat, rice, and pulse industry to meet with Government of Iraq buyers in Amman, Jordan . . . to begin 
the process of clarifying and modifying contract terms uses by Iraq.‖ Id. Schatz did not specify which 
companies were involved, and was likewise vague when he said that ―[c]ontract terms are still an 
issue, but upcoming meetings with the U.S. industry will continue to work on those outstanding 
issues.‖ Id. 
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world.
147
 If this is the case, the future of farmers‘ ability to save seed in 
Iraq, where statutory development is in flux, should be an open 
question.
148
 For example, in Argentina, Monsanto struggled to prevent 
farmers from saving seed due to a lack of patent protection for transgenic 
biotechnological seed in Argentinean patent law.
149
 
Iraq is not yet a WTO member, so is not bound by the TRIPS 
Agreement.
150
 As part of Iraq‘s accession into the WTO, it must 
implement policies in line with WTO principles.
151
 An attorney advisor in 
the U.S. Patent Office wrote a law, which went into effect in Iraq in 2004, 
aimed at helping Iraq meet WTO admission standards.
152
 However, Order 
81, prohibiting Iraqi farmers from saving or replanting any seed from 
varieties that breeders have claimed as their own, is more restrictive than 
U.S. law.
153
 
 
 
 147. Winston, supra note 97, at 322. 
 148. Iraqi constitutional law was historically prohibitive of private ownership of biological 
resources. GRAIN, supra note 141. Surveying Iraq‘s legal roots is essential to understanding the Iraqi 
judiciary‘s conception of property rights. See Dan E. Stigall, A Closer Look at Iraqi Property and Tort 
Law, 68 LA. L. REV. 765, 768 (2008). Though secular legal institutions predominated in pre-2003 Iraq, 
Islamic law did influence the Iraqi Civil Code and provides important cultural context. Id. Under the 
Iraqi Civil Code, any possession of material value is ―property.‖ Id. at 772. The Iraqi Code recognizes 
―the right to complete ownership of property.‖ Id. ―Under the Iraqi Code, perfect ownership vests the 
owner with the absolute right to dispose of his or her property through use, enjoyment, and 
exploitation of the thing owned, its fruits, crops, and anything the property produces.‖ Id. (emphasis 
added). The Iraqi Code also allows that the right to use the fruits of a thing can be owned 
independently from the title of the original thing. Id. at 790. For the purposes of crop ownership, one 
interesting vestige of Ottoman law that still influences Iraqi legal doctrine is the concept of tassaruf. 
Id. at 797. Under tassaruf, the land owner has extraordinary power over his property and the crops and 
buildings thereon. Id. at 798. The Ottoman legal device of al musaqat also remains influential in Iraqi 
conception of property rights. Id. at 802–04. Al musaqat is a contract between the owner of a plant and 
a farmer. In return for cultivating the plant, the farmer is entitled to a share of the fruits. Id. 
 149. Morgan et al., supra note 12, at 109. 
 150. World Trade Organization, Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/ 
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2010). 
 151. Working Party Reviews Iraq’s Trade Legislation, supra note 67. 
 152. Cox, supra note 119, at 559. 
 153. Id. at 560. Linda Lourie is the U.S. Patent Office attorney who helped write the Iraq law. Id. 
Of the laws that would help Iraq ―meet the standards required to join the World Trade Organization, 
one . . . is protection of plant varieties.‖ Id. at 559.  
The WTO standard requires new plant varieties created by breeders to be treated like 
inventions, giving plant breeders or seed companies exclusive rights to the varieties they 
create. In April 2004, an order that Lourie helped write went into effect, prohibiting farmers 
from saving and replanting any seeds from varieties that breeders have claimed as their own. 
Groups are now protesting the order, which is far more restrictive than the American law that 
allows farmers to save part of their harvest and use the seed on their own farms. One 
advocacy group, known as Grain, ridiculed the law as a declaration of war against the Iraqi 
farmer because it encourages private control over plant varieties. Although the order doesn‘t 
restrict the use of traditional varieties that Iraqi farmers have been planting, the advocacy 
group is worried that the traditional varieties might begin to disappear, and Iraqi farmers 
would not be allowed to save or share seed from new varieties. 
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2. Company Rights 
Seed companies have an obligation to protect their investments.
154
 Seed 
companies need variety protection to help fund research and development 
of improved varieties.
155
 Monsanto has said vis-à-vis U.S. patent 
interpretation that the courts‘ affirmation of biotech interests in their 
product helps ensure ―continued investment into the kind of research and 
development necessary to keep growers on the cutting edge of 
productivity. We believe strong intellectual property protection will 
encourage the investment needed to maintain continued crop 
improvement.‖156  
Biotech industries struggle when introducing a product into developing 
(or crisis-ridden) countries, like Iraq, because these countries often lack 
the capability to effectively enforce contractual use provisions between 
farmers and companies.
157
 
3. Farmers’ Rights 
Biogenetic agricultural technology has transformed modern agriculture, 
and, as in any industry, technological advances can work to disrupt settled 
practice and tradition.
158
 The U.S. analysis of patent rights gives biotech 
companies control over the transgenic seeds they produce that trumps even 
the ―eons-old traditional right of farmers to save seeds for future use.‖159 
This long-established agricultural custom allowing farmers to plant next 
year‘s crop ―remains the primary method of obtaining seeds‖ in the 
developing world.
160
 Developing nations improve the integrity of their 
crops through the continuing custom of seed-saving and brown bagging.
161
 
 
 
Id. at 559–60 (citations omitted). 
 154. Ron Smith, Plant Variety Protection Act Is Now Being Enforced, Sw. FARM PRESS, Jan. 16, 
2007, http://southwestfarmpress.com/news/011607-protection-act/. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Glenn Hess, Supreme Court Backs Monsanto in Seed Patent Case, CHEM. & ENG‘G NEWS, 
Jan. 9, 2008, http://pubs.acs.org/cen/news/86/i02/8602news4.html. 
 157. A. Bryan Endres & Peter D. Goldsmith, Alternative Business Strategies in Weak Intellectual 
Property Environments: A Law and Economics Analysis of the Agro-biotechnology Firm’s Strategic 
Dilemma, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 237, 239–40 (2007). 
 158. Id. at 243–44. 
 159. Katie Black & James Wishart, Commentary, Containing the GMO Genie: Cattle Trespass 
and the Rights and Responsibilities of Biotechnology Owners, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 397, 420 
(2008). 
 160. Barron, supra note 71, at 272. ―For example, ninety-five percent of the millet grown in 
Zambia comes from saved seed.‖ Id. at 272–73 (footnote omitted). 
 161. Id. at 273. Barron states that Chinese farmers brown bag over fifty percent of their wheat 
seed. Id. 
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Even though transnational companies provide developing countries ―an 
abundance of relatively inexpensive seeds,‖ farmers in these countries 
continue to rely on saving seed.
162
 
The timeworn notion that farmers have a right to save their seed from 
one year‘s harvest, for use in next year‘s crop, directly conflicts with 
transnational companies‘ patent rights in agricultural systems that rely 
heavily on rural seed saving—such as Iraq. Jason Barron notes: 
If farmers lose the right to save seed, they immediately become 
beholden to the corporate interests supplying them with the sterile 
seeds. This in turn means that the countries to which these farmers 
belong are subordinate to these corporations. Concerns over 
developed-developing country economic imbalances has led 
developing nations to view strong patent rights as a way for 
developed nations to extract more money from the developing 
world.
163
 
 U.S. interpretation and enforcement of the PVPA cause problems for 
farmers when shortages of certified seed for farmers to plant occur.
164
 
These shortages are the reason most farmers would save seed in the first 
place.
165
 Farmers‘ hands are tied if they want to retain their ―brown bag 
sale‖ seed-saving ability; non-PVPA protected varieties are harder to find, 
and harder to maintain in a market saturated with higher-yield PVPA 
varieties.
166
  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Agricultural production in Iraq was collapsing before the 2003 U.S.-led 
invasion,
167
 and the continued violence and unrest no doubt prevented 
immediate post-Saddam agricultural growth. U.S. initiatives to provide 
resources to Iraqi farmers therefore seem a necessary part of 
reconstruction. 
While membership in organizations like the WTO would likely 
stimulate Iraq‘s economic growth (including growth in the agricultural 
sector), Order 81 restricts Iraqi farmer rights beyond that required by the 
WTO. If Iraq does not need regulations as stringent as Order 81 for 
 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 283. 
 164. Press Release, Coalition Provisional Authority, supra note 127. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Cox, supra note 119, at 544. 
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membership to international organizations, then the Order effectively 
over-restricts farmers.  
If the aim of the CPA‘s orders was Iraqi reconstruction, it seems 
counterintuitive to implement an order that hamstrings farmers. Iraq is part 
of the ancient Fertile Crescent—the birthplace of agriculture.168 The year 
before the U.S invasion of Iraq, ninety-seven percent of Iraqi farmers 
relied on saved seed.
169
 Therefore, while U.S. farmers who save seeds 
derived from patented plant products are classified as ―pirates,‖170 the 
criminalization of such a significant portion of Iraqi farmers is premature. 
Order 81‘s preemptive protection of genetic seed patents at the expense 
of farmer rights to save seed denies Iraq the right to fashion a patent law 
most responsive to its own needs. While U.S. courts uniformly find that 
federal patent law prohibits saving seed, ambiguities between international 
treaties, enacting statutes, and the Patent Act reveal that such U.S. court 
interpretation is not self-evident. The imposition of even stricter farmer 
restraints in Iraq without the benefit of Iraq‘s own judicial interpretation 
threatens the ancient practice of saving seed upon which Iraqi farmers—
and by extension the Iraqi people—rely.  
Kelly T. Crosby  
 
 
 168. Volker Mrasek, The Not-So-Fertile Crescent: Climate Change Threatens Cradle of 
Civilization, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT‘L, Apr. 16, 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/ 
0,1518,547763,00.html. 
 169. Muscati, supra note 8, at 504. 
 170. See Adam Liptak, Saving Seeds Subjects Farmers to Suits over Patent, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 
2003, at A18.  
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